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(11/17/62)

DRAFT UNITED STATES WORKING PAPER

SUBJECT: CARIBBEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. There are two phases to be considered. The verification phase and the safeguards phase.
2. Verification is required performance under the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding - i.e., to make sure that offensive weapons systems have been dismantled and removed from Cuba. There is no question of responsibility or mutuality here. The Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding had to do with offensive weapons in Cuba, and verification must take place in Cuba along.
3. Safeguards in the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding were to be safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, in other words, safeguards against action by the Soviet Union and Cuba. It was not the intent of the Kennedy letter of October 27 that safeguards were to apply to assurances against invasion. Therefore, the problem of "mutuality" goes beyond a strict interpretation of the understanding. It may, however, be advisable for the U.S. to consider proposals re safeguards which go beyond such a strict interpretation in the direction of "mutuality" and protection against invasion; but, concurrently, they should also be beyond "offensive weapons systems" as implied by a strict interpretation of the agreement.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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 () COMMUNITY
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4. This suggests the possibility of a Caribbean inspection system. We can conceive of such an inspection system that would involve inspection in areas beyond Cuba, including United States territory in the Caribbean but we would want to make ~~very~~ sure of the following points in any such security scheme.

5. Purpose -

(a) To make sure that offensive weapons systems are not reintroduced into Cuba.

(b) To investigate serious complaints of preparations for, or the initiation of, invasion of Cuba from any area of the Caribbean and invasion of any area of the Caribbean from Cuba.

These purposes should be accomplished without prejudice to certain larger purposes of the U.S., including: to assure that no military presence in the Caribbean on the part of non Caribbean countries constitutes a threat to the peace in the area; and to guard against the invasion of any area of the Caribbean from any other area in the Caribbean. (Invasion to be defined as the violation of the frontiers of any country of the Caribbean by organized armed forces of any other Caribbean country contrary to the principles of the Rio Treaty and of the UN)

6. Location

Since Cuba is the focus of the invasion problem as well as the offensive weapons problem it follows that the "presence"

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designed to prevent invasion by public exposure will be located primarily in Cuba. This is the method that has worked best in comparable situations around the world. The UN presence in Korea was there when South Korea was invaded from North Korea, and was able to certify the facts of the case. The UN presence in Greece concerned itself with guerrilla attacks on the constituted Greek authorities. A UN presence in the Gaza Strip and along the Egyptian-Israeli border operates on the Egyptian side of that line, to prevent a recurrence of the Sinai invasion. The UN presence in the Congo has as one of its important purposes the frustration and exposure of attempts to bring in military and other aid from the outside without UN clearance. (It was under this authority that UEOC prevented a good deal of military aid from getting to the Stanleyville Separatists, and it was under the same authority that the UN has arrested "Black Eagle" Julian and other Katanga mercenaries). The primary assurance against invasion would therefore come from the location in Cuba of a UN presence under instructions to switch on the klieg lights in the event of invasion from the outside.

This same presence could be authorized to investigate complaints of preparations for, or the initiation of, invasion of Cuba from any area of the Caribbean and invasion of any area of the Caribbean from Cuba. For our part, we would be willing to have UN

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personnel visit our open society for this purpose.

7. Auspices -

The process of establishing such a presence might well start with an OAS resolution recommending the establishment of a UN presence and defining its scope.

However, it would not be desirable for this presence to be authorized by and report to the Security Council of the United Nations, since that would import into the Caribbean the Soviet veto and would have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing the intrusion by the Soviet Union into the affairs of this Hemisphere. What we want is the ability to use UN executive machinery as the executive agent of the nations concerned with the security of the Caribbean area.

Pursuant to an OAS recommendation, therefore, the UN Secretary General or a group of concerned countries would call together an ad hoc conference of (a) OAS members with interests in the Caribbean; (b) Jamaica and Trinidad; and (c) the European nations (UK, France, the Netherlands) which have dependant territories in the Caribbean area. This ad hoc conference would establish the terms of reference to the security arrangements, exchange non-invasion pledges, and ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to act on behalf of this group of countries in developing

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a continuing presence in the Caribbean.

8. Executive Machinery -

The "presence" should, of course, be staffed by citizens of the countries concerned, and financed by them according to an appropriate burden-sharing formula. The executive staff would have the authority to investigate on its own motion or on complaint. It would be supervised by the committee of countries established by the ad hoc conference, which could make sure by some appropriate vote (a 2/3 majority?) that complaints being investigated were not merely frivolous. Reports by the inspectors would be filed with all the members of the Caribbean security system, with the OAS, and with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

9. Denuclearized Zone -

Such measures as these would not necessarily be a substitute for a larger arrangement on nuclear weapons along the lines of the Brazilian resolution. Indeed, if a denuclearized zone was established by a conference that included all of the Latin American countries, the Secretary General might be asked to use the organization already developed for Caribbean safeguards, to investigate complaints of violations of the Zone agreement anywhere in the Latin American area.

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SUBJECT: CARIBBEAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

1. There are two phases to be considered. The verification phase and the safeguards phase.

2. Verification is required performance under the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding - i.e., to make sure that offensive weapons systems have been dismantled and removed from Cuba. There is no question of responsibility or mutuality here. The Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding had to do with offensive weapons in Cuba, and verification must take place in Cuba alone.

3. When it comes to safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons, the problem is primarily a matter for action inside Cuba. But the Cubans and the Soviets have been indicating that there should likewise be inspection of the United States and Latin American assurances that they will not invade Cuba if Cuba behaves itself.

4. This suggests the possibility of a Caribbean inspection system. We can conceive of such an inspection system that would involve inspection in areas beyond Cuba, including United States territories, but we would want to make very sure of the following points in any such security scheme.

5. Purpose -

(a) To make sure that offensive weapons systems are not reintroduced into Cuba;

(b) To investigate

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(b) To investigate serious complaints of preparations for, or the initiation of, invasion of any area of the Caribbean from any other area.

6. Location -

Since Cuba is the focus of the invasion problem as well as the offensive weapons problem, it follows that the "presence" designed to prevent invasion by public exposure will be located primarily in Cuba. This is the method that has worked best in comparable situations around the world. The UN presence in Korea was there when South Korea was invaded from North Korea, and was able to certify the facts of the case. The UN presence in Greece concerned itself with guerrilla attacks on the constituted Greek authorities. A UN presence in the Gaza Strip and along the Egyptian-Israeli border operates on the Egyptian side of that line, to prevent a recurrence of the Sinai invasion. The UN presence in the Congo has as one of its important purposes the frustration and exposure of attempts to bring in military and other aid from the outside without UN clearance. (It was under this authority that UNOC prevented a good deal of military aid from getting to the Stanleyville Separatists; and it was under the same authority that the UN has arrested "Black Eagle" Julian and other Katanga mercenaries). The primary assurance against invasion would therefore come from the location in Cuba of a UN presence under instructions to switch on the klieg lights in the event of invasion

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invasion from the outside.

This same presence could be authorized to investigate complaints of preparations elsewhere in the Caribbean area. For our part, we would be willing to have UN personnel visit our open society for this purpose.

7. Auspices -

The process of establishing such a presence might well start with an OAS resolution recommending the establishment of a UN presence and defining its scope.

However, it would not be desirable for this presence to be authorized by and report to the Security Council of the United Nations, since that would import into the Caribbean the Soviet veto and would have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing the intrusion by the Soviet Union into the affairs of this Hemisphere. What we want is the ability to use UN executive machinery as the executive agent of the nations concerned with the security of the Caribbean area.

Pursuant to an OAS recommendation, therefore, the UN Secretary General or a group of concerned countries would call together an ad hoc conference of (a) OAS members with interests in the Caribbean; (b) Jamaica and Trinidad; and (c) the European nations (UK, France, the Netherlands) which have dependent territories in the Caribbean area. This ad hoc conference

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would establish the terms of reference to the security arrangements, exchange non-invasion pledges, and ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to act on behalf of this group of countries in developing a continuing presence in the Caribbean.

8. Executive Machinery -

The "presence" should, of course, be staffed by citizens of the countries concerned, and financed by them according to an appropriate burden-sharing formula. The executive staff would have the authority to investigate on its own motion or on complaint. It would be supervised by the committee of countries established by the ad hoc conference, which could make sure by some appropriate vote (a 2/3 majority?) that complaints being investigated were not merely frivolous. Reports by the inspectors would be filed with all the members of the Caribbean security system, with the OAS, and with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

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Such measures as these would not necessarily be a substitute for a larger arrangement on nuclear weapons along the lines of the Brazilian resolution. Indeed, if a denuclearized zone was established by a conference that included all of the

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Latin American countries, the Secretary General might be asked to use the organization already developed for Caribbean safeguards, to investigate complaints of violations of the Zone agreement anywhere in the Latin American area.

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